As described in ADP 3-0 war is only one component of unified land operations. The underlying theory of war as implied in ADP 3-0 is the continuation of Clausewitz’s theory of war and that war is “but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” Using the Clausewitzian theory of war as a lens to analyze ADP 3-0, the assessment of ADP 3-0 is that unified land operations have replaced war as the continuation of policy with other means. Unfortunately, based on the US Army’s theory of war and warfare, they have incorrectly described operational art and the relationship between unified land operations, operational art, and strategic aims. In spite of this exclusion, a further review of ADP 3-0 reveals that the US Army did have an implicit theory of war and warfare that underlines ADP 3-0. This omission in conjunction with a new doctrinal concept for the execution of operational art creates confusion and ambiguity on the role of operational art and its relationship to unified land operations.
ADP 3-0 attempts to provide the future framework for the range of military operations the US Army expects to conduct, but without the explicit reference to the nature of war and the character of warfare.
ADP 3-0 is the capstone publication of US Army doctrine that provides the common operational concept for the use of Army forces. ADP 3-0: A Theory of War Disconnected from Operational ArtĪ great source of frustration when reading current US Army doctrine, specifically Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 Unified Land Operations, is the lack of a definitive characterization of the theory of war and warfare.